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State of Europe, State of the Field
Amidst the rising tide of anti-immigration across 
all of Europe – which now includes Eastern and Southern 
Europeans as much as familiar targets such as Muslims 
or undocumented Africans – there has been little 
questioning of the dominant mainstream progressive 
response to the consequences of migration: that 
‘integration’ is the best and most realistic solution for 
nations now having to accommodate the populations 
who have moved into or around Europe during the past 
two highly mobile decades of the 1990s and 2000s.1 
This short discussion piece revisits my own work 
1 Text of keynote presentation at the Austrian Ministry of 
Integration policy conference, “Europe on the Move: Participation 
and Integration of EU citizens” (May 2013); and panel presentation 
at the 2013 Dahrendorf Colloquium, “Combining Freedom and 
Diversity: Lessons from Experience in Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany and the United States,” St. Anthony’s College, Oxford 
University (May 2013). It is a synthesis of ideas that will be 
presented in a forthcoming volume of collected essays (Favell 
2014).
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of the 1990s that identified the rising power – and 
problems – of the national integration paradigm 
(Favell 1998; 2001; 2003), which has come to be 
the dominant post-migration policy approach in 
all of Europe. The notion of integration is deeply 
embedded in nation-building stories at the heart 
of the European nation-state, but there has always 
been an anachronistic aspect of integrationist 
thinking, out of touch with changing realities of 
migration on the ground. This ideological gap 
has often produced pathologies of politics and 
policymaking, which force diverse migration and 
settlement patterns into inappropriate categories 
and terms of debate. The blithe social theoretical 
naivety of promoters of the concept also contributes 
to its ineffectiveness. Yet, as I argue here, the 
continuing success of the term in contemporary 
politics has only become more problematic in 
relation to the new forms of migration and mobility 
ascendant in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Alarm bells should already be ringing 
given the obvious origins of the term in the 
classic sociology of Emile Durkheim and his 
theorization of late nineteenth-century processes 
of nation-building: how the rapidly modernizing 
and industrializing European societies of that 
era – characterized by increasing differentiation, 
complexity, diversity, and social change – might 
still function as integrated ‘organic’ units, unified 
by abstract political or moral values. These values 
are best expressed in the modern, democratic 
notion of national citizenship: with citizenship as a 
status given to individuals in society, enabling their 
full participation and recognition as members, and 
affirming their political identity as a self-contained 
‘nation-state-society’. As befitted the modern 
nation-building aspirations of European societies in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
these societies imagined themselves as bounded, 
container-like units, made up of specific population 
on a given territory: insiders were citizens, outsiders 
were foreigners; the process of national integration 
was one focused on the progressive inclusion of all 
different social groups and minorities (particularly 
women, working classes, and regional minorities) 
into an inclusive notion of national citizenship, 
a progressive historical narrative most famously 
formulated in the postwar era by the British 
sociologist T. H. Marshall. 
In many ways, we might see the ‘good old 
days’ of the 1950s and 60s as the apogee of national 
citizenship within the container nation-state, with 
the development of strongly inclusive and broadly 
egalitarian liberal democratic welfare states in the 
Europe of that era. Crucially, though, the worker 
immigrants that helped these successful liberal 
capitalist democracies to grow during that era were 
an anomaly in the picture; foreigners who had 
crossed the borders of the state and who fulfilled a 
function in the society, but were still substantially 
excluded from citizenship, existing in an unclear 
and tense relation to their hosts. After the 
immigration stop across Europe in the early 1970s, 
however, the Marshallian triptych was hesistantly, 
and often with great conflict, extended to these 
populations (and their families). The conception of 
national integration henceforth began to include 
immigrants.
Integration, I would argue, almost invariably 
implies a social theory and narrative of this kind: 
a conception of a bounded national society that 
can be defined by its more or less inclusive rules 
of membership, but which also for functional 
reasons imposes social closure to non-members 
and demands a certain socialization – bluntly put, 
a nationalization – of the (new) insider population. 
My simple point is that integration now – after the 
‘global era’ of the 1990s and 2000s – cannot be 
what it was. During this era, the world has changed; 
a new stage of globalization has swept through 
the old, bounded, container nation-state-society, 
further individualizing society, loosening social 
bonds, rendering borders more porous, and seeing 
a flattening of time and space, which enables these 
individuals to be far more mobile – in both physical 
and virtual terms – in relation to their national 
societies and social identities.
One of the signal features of this globalization 
has been macro-regional integration (the other 
confusing use of this term), which, during the 1990s 
and 2000s, has not been unique to Europe. But 
Europe – in the shape of the European Union (EU) 
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– has been quite unique in terms of legal/political 
institutional developments that have decisively 
changed the nature of migration into and around 
the continent. The advance of the EU saw, with the 
establishment of the Single European Act of 1986 
and the Maastrict Treaty of 1993, the completion of 
a single market space across Europe that enabled 
the full extension of rights of movement of persons 
to all EU citizens; as one of the canonical four factors 
of mobility – capital, goods, services, and persons – 
theorized by economists as the drivers of economic 
development in an integrating Europe. All European 
citizens could in theory live and work freely of their 
own choice in any of the EU member states: an act 
which transformed, in legal and political terms, if 
not always in sociological reality, all such mobile 
individuals from external immigrants crossing state 
borders into internal free movers within a single, 
expanding economic space (i.e., labor market).
Added to this were the momentous 
consequences of 1989 and all that: the ending 
of the East-West division of Europe and the 
geopolitical healing of the continent, via a process 
of further European integration that would include 
numerous new member states (and potentially 
many other candidate states) through enlargement 
(achieved for 12 new members in 2004 and 2008). 
This accession, via the extension of EU legal acquis, 
would mean that that the mobilities of the free 
European space would eventually extend to all 
the citizens of the new member states, which 
included major migrant-sending countries such as 
Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. Although 
steep accession barriers to immediate freedom 
of movement were imposed in many countries, 
the legal and political reality was that henceforth 
all European mobile populations from these 
new member states must also turn from being 
immigrants into free movers, if and when they were 
able to use their new rights of citizenship to move 
West. Moreover, the concentric ‘neighborhood’-
building logic of expansive EU policies toward 
countries bordering the EU-27 meant that, via new 
economic agreements, border cooperation and 
visa regimes, conceptually at least, transnational 
migrations from close neighbors such as the 
Ukraine, Morocco, Serbia or Turkey might also 
potentially be thought of in terms of internal 
European free movement rather than immigration.
There is, however, little trace of this legal-
political construction in current debates across 
Europe about ‘integration’. The new internal 
migrants of Europe are simply blurred clumsily into 
both settled, long-term ethnic minority populations 
and newer global immigrations from around the 
planet. The reaction in national contexts to the 
pressures of these diverse new and old migrations 
has been reactionary and singular: the strong 
return and re-articulation of highly nationalized 
conceptions of integration, in many countries 
entailing new conditions on migrant populations 
– both European and non-European – desiring 
long-term residence. These include strict language 
competence conditions; humiliating citizenship 
tests demanding arcane knowledge of national 
‘core’ cultures; conditionality on upholding 
particular moralities and political loyalties; 
spotlessly clean criminal records; and endless grand 
debates about national identity and the threat of 
‘backward’ foreign values, such as Islamic beliefs or 
the criminality of Roma populations. I would read 
all this as an index of a growing national anxiety 
in the face of the rampant mobilities of the global 
era: anachronistic, rearguard attempts at nation-
building in the nineteenth century mould, imposing 
unified ideas of national ‘culture’ and conditions 
of citizenship on the most vulnerable part of the 
population; a wholly symbolic gesture, since they 
could never be imposed in this way on ordinary 
national citizens. The reality of highly fragmented, 
very un-Durkheimian porous and multi-leveled 
modern societies we now live in, is that most 
ordinary ‘native’ citizens are highly globalized, 
flexible and mobile individuals, who often enjoy an 
almost à la carte choice of the rights and benefits, 
duties and obligations associated with national 
citizenship or participation in mainstream national 
society.
Clearly, there are highly problematic 
issues about the unfair and unrealistic imposition 
of integration norms on non-European migrant 
populations under these conditions. But even 
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if they were justifiable in functional terms (i.e., 
equipping them for the labor market, or improving 
school performance of students), it is still necessary 
to ask if they are at all appropriate for the new EU 
movers: free-moving EU citizens living and working 
in other European countries, who are clearly not 
in a legal or political sense, im-migrants in Europe. 
Sociologically speaking, of course, this is a 
normative hypothesis, generated by an abstract 
economic theory of European integration, which 
must be tested. My research strategy was always 
to start with the ideal case scenario (Favell 2008) 
– the most privileged and unproblematic free 
movers – and move backward in terms of human 
capital or social power relative to the ‘integrating; 
host society. The ideal type of EU free mover 
is not difficult to find. They are incarnated, for 
instance, in the almost un-remarked presence of 
young West European free movers who, during the 
post-Maastricht 1990s and 2000s, used their free-
movement opportunities in increasing numbers 
to move to rich, highly globalized northwestern 
cities of the continent. A case in point would be 
the droves of young French people who, during 
London’s boom and the ongoing sclerosis of the 
French economy, moved to Britain – or, we might 
say, hopped across the Channel – to seek their 
fortune in the swinging, economic capital of Europe, 
London. Massively attractive in economic terms, 
London’s labor market was also uniquely open and 
accessible to EU citizens in all kinds of high- and 
low-end service sector jobs, as well as creative, 
educational and high-tech work. They duly became 
the ideal high-performing population of migration 
theory legend, with selection mechanisms to 
make economists drool: uniformly young, highly 
talented, ambitious and dynamic, largely costless, 
out-performing natives, and unlikely to stay and 
settle permanently. In terms of demographic and 
economic dynamics, London essentially became 
the European New York City in this period: matching 
the number one global city all the way statistically 
between 2000 and 2005.
So what might ‘integration’ mean for these 
highly mobile Europeans, in distinction to classic 
non-European immigrants? It is a simple empirical 
question when you talk to them, something that 
quickly falsifies much of the national integration 
paradigm. They do not see themselves as ‘migrants’ 
at all. Naturalization (becoming British) is a 
completely irrelevant question; they have no interest 
or compulsion to ‘integrate’ into Britain or (even 
less likely) England. What they do see themselves 
as integrating into is a conception of the city: into a 
global and off-shore European London, into which 
anyone and everyone can become a Londoner. The 
integration issues that matter to them are all labor-
market related: the uncompromised recognition 
of imported skills and education; measures to 
combat the informal advantages of local insiders 
(the ‘old boy’ parochialism rife in Europe, but 
supposedly less in London); unquestioned access 
to the welfare benefits of ordinary employees; 
and some kind of solution to the longer-term, still 
missing ‘social securities’, which are the factors that 
most often break the mobility project and send 
people back home – dealing with raising children 
in a foreign city, reliance on peculiar or untrusted 
medical services, and the long-term confusions 
surrounding the mobility of European pensions 
(the EU’s most significant failure in the creation of 
EU free movement rights). 
The EU movers were, in other words, 
invisible migrants – for whom ‘integration’ as it is 
largely conceived was irrelevant. The telling point 
here of course is to measure other European 
migrants in relation to this benchmark. Clearly, 
being French rather than Balkan matters in this 
context. When high-skilled Turks, or even free-
moving skilled Polish, anxiously bet on obtaining 
British citizenship and start to plot long-term 
settlement for their spouses and children, putting 
themselves through an humiliating naturalization 
process in which they (often emotionally) betray 
their own identities and transnational lifestyles, we 
are no longer in the Europe of the EU. Rather, we 
are in an old, hierarchical Europe of colonial nation-
states where, rudely put, being British makes you 
superior to being Polish or Turkish. 
For a while, however, this was not the 
outcome of the dramatic Polish migration to the 
booming British economy in the mid 2000s: more 
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than half a million registered, certainly more off 
the books. There was still a moment between 
2004 and 2006 when normal political hostilities 
to immigration were suspended and the idealized 
economic theory of migration in the EU came true, 
in Britain (and Ireland) only, and for this particular 
labor movement: a win-win-win scenario, in which 
Polish workers moved freely and took over niches in 
the British economy; the British economy boomed 
on the back of a workforce substituting nationals 
in jobs they didn’t want to do or couldn’t do half 
as well; and money, people, and influence flowed 
freely back into a fast-moving Polish economy. 
Of course, this moment is past. British politics is 
now dominated by its anti-EU drift: with the UK 
Independence Party taking more than 20 percent 
of the votes in the 2013 local elections on the back 
of an openly xenophobic (but not racist) platform 
howling against ‘Europeans’ who take ‘our’ jobs and 
steal ‘our’ benefits, and even mobilizing the support 
of established British ethnic and racial minorities. 
And sociologically speaking (again, in terms of 
specific research I have been involved in, i.e., Favell 
and Elrick 2008; Favell and Nebe 2009) – excepting 
arguably that brief moment in Britain during 
the 2000s – new Polish migrations and certainly 
Romanian migrations have never really sustained 
the purity of the economic theory of migration. 
Even before the economic downtown of 2008, 
Poles and Romanians have, in their experience of 
everyday interactions, always been differentiated 
and discriminated ethnically from other Europeans 
as ‘Poles’ and ‘Romanians’ from the ‘East’; they 
face downward mobility relative to their skills and 
origin status in their home countries, albeit while 
earning well; there is a chronic mismatch of human 
capital in much of the work they end up doing 
(doctors driving taxis), and they are systematically 
filtered into exploitative roles in the secondary 
labor market, more often dirtier, dumber, and more 
dangerous than the work of nationals. And, even 
highly skilled movers – a much larger part of East-
West migration than is ever recognized – continue 
to complain of prejudice and glass ceilings, even 
relative to West European foreigners. In other 
words, their experience still resembles what we 
expect of ‘normal’, unfair immigration processes 
typical anywhere else.
The routine and growing discrimination 
faced by Poles and Romanians as they seek to 
pursue their fortunes as EU citizens is more than 
just a sociological disappointment; it is stark proof 
that Europe has failed. Perhaps it was too much to 
hope that they would become ‘invisible’ Europeans 
like the others; but the prognosis is, in fact, even 
worse. Now, the residual barriers, the ad-hoc 
profiling, the illegal quotas and informal restrictions 
– in short, the routine public hostility – is all now 
no longer only looking East; it is also looking South, 
with resentments and prejudices surfacing, which 
were barely concealed beneath the surface in 
proudly ‘Nordic’ countries such as Denmark – but 
also now also in Britain and Germany. The target 
now also includes Greek and Portuguese movers, 
and soon maybe young, highly qualified Spaniards 
and Italians. They are all becoming visible again: 
turning into immigrants who no longer enjoy 
unconditional European citizenship; migrants who 
are no longer free to be just European residents, 
and whose tolerated presence may be henceforth 
conditional on their willingness to integrate. 
European citizenship was always a weak 
institution, but it contained a European ideal that 
the continent is rapidly forgetting. Europe fails 
when all EU movers are not treated equally as EU 
nationals; but it also fails when they are viewed or 
treated as immigrants and foreigners in a Europe 
that is supposed, simply and unconditionally, to be 
their homeland.
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